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Seeing is Believing: The Anti-Inference Bias 
EYAL ZAMIR, ILANA RITOV, AND DORON TEICHMAN∗ 
A large body of studies suggests that people are reluctant to impose liability on 
the basis of circumstantial evidence alone, even when this evidence is more reliable 
than direct evidence. Current explanations for this pattern of behavior focus on 
factors such as the tendency of fact finders to assign low subjective probabilities to 
circumstantial evidence, the statistical nature of such evidence, and the fact that 
direct evidence can rule out with greater ease any competing factual theory 
regarding liability. 
This Article describes a set of four new experiments demonstrating that even 
when these factors are controlled for, the disinclination to impose liability based on 
indirect evidence remains. While these findings do not necessarily refute the 
existing theories, they indicate that these theories are incomplete and point to the 
existence of a deep-seated bias against basing liability on inferences—an anti-
inference bias. The Article discusses the potential policy implications of the new 
findings for procedural and substantive legal norms. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Sherlock Holmes, Hercules Poirot, Sir Henry Merrivale, and even Dr. Gregory 
House have long been admired for their ability to solve mysteries using logic, 
deductive reasoning, and inferences from circumstantial evidence. However, the 
creators of detective stories and TV dramas almost never rely solely on this type of 
evidence. The detective story or TV episode will typically include a climactic scene 
in which direct evidence, such as a confession by the culprit, is presented. This 
serves to reassure the readers and viewers that the inferential arguments were 
indeed correct. The implicit assumption seems to be that inferences are insufficient 
to determine the culpability of the suspect (an assumption which is reinforced by 
the technique of incorporating misleading circumstantial evidence into detective 
stories and TV dramas). 
The same is plausibly true in the courtroom. There are grounds to believe that 
judicial fact finders treat direct and circumstantial evidence differently and are 
more reluctant to impose liability on the basis of circumstantial evidence alone.1 In 
exhibiting this reluctance, fact finders sometimes follow legal norms that caution 
against relying on circumstantial evidence, but more often disregard legal norms 
that deny the relevance of this distinction.2 Scholars largely agree that this tendency 
is indefensible.3 In fact, it is sometimes noted that circumstantial evidence is more 
reliable than direct evidence, and thus discounting its probative value is a 
“paradox.”4 
Several explanations have been offered for the tendency not to impose liability 
solely on the basis of circumstantial evidence. Most of these explanations, 
however, are incomplete at best.5 They are incomplete because too often they 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. See Kevin Jon Heller, The Cognitive Psychology of Circumstantial Evidence, 105 
MICH. L. REV. 241, 247–55 (2006). 
 2. See Richard K. Greenstein, Determining Facts: The Myth of Direct Evidence, 45 
HOUS. L. REV. 1801, 1802–04 (2009) (surveying American federal and state case law); infra 
Part II. 
 3. See 1A JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 961 (Peter 
Tillers rev. ed., 1983) (“Wigmore’s view that circumstantial evidence may be as persuasive 
and as compelling as testimonial evidence, and sometimes more so, is now generally 
accepted.”); Greenstein, supra note 2, at 1804 (stating that “common beliefs about the 
significance of the distinction [between direct and circumstantial evidence] are false”). 
 4. Heller, supra note 1, at 244; see also Greenstein, supra note 2, at 1803 (pointing to 
the incompatibility between instructions that caution against relying on circumstantial 
evidence and the empirical data “indicating that at least some types of circumstantial 
evidence are actually more reliable than familiar categories of direct evidence” (emphasis in 
original)). 
 5. For a complete review, see infra Part II. 
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conflate the direct versus circumstantial evidence distinction with related ones, 
such as between eyewitness testimonies and scientific data, between concrete and 
statistical proof, and between probabilistic and conclusive evidence. Once we 
recognize that circumstantial evidence may be either eyewitness or forensic, 
concrete or statistical, probabilistic or conclusive, and so forth, we can appreciate 
the limitations of theories that rest on these distinctions. 
This Article describes a series of new experiments demonstrating that even 
when we have controlled for such factors as the eyewitness/forensic, 
concrete/statistical, and probabilistic/conclusive character of the evidence, the 
disinclination to impose liability based on non-direct evidence remains. While our 
findings do not necessarily refute the existing theories, they indicate that these 
theories are insufficient and point to the existence of a deep-seated bias against 
basing liability on inferences from circumstantial evidence—an anti-inference bias. 
The existence of an anti-inference bias gives rise to numerous complex 
normative questions that have not been fully addressed by the legal literature. On 
one hand, like other biases and heuristics, the anti-inference heuristic very often 
yields accurate decisions and might be a reasonable rule of thumb for people to 
follow in making their daily choices (that normally do not involve a courtroom). 
This suggests that debiasing judicial fact finders might require them to reach 
outcomes that are not aligned with the intuitions of most people regarding the 
desirable outcome of trial—a possibility that raises both practical and normative 
concerns. On the other hand, the anti-inference bias might give rise to systematic 
errors, especially in the context of judicial fact finding. This possibility highlights 
the need to design new and sophisticated tools that will help debias fact finders in 
order to improve the quality of their choices. Alternatively, to the extent the bias 
generates a hurdle to assigning legal responsibility in situations that require fact 
finders to draw inferences, policy makers can overcome it by introducing legal 
presumptions and by broadening the scope of legal liability. For example, in the 
context of the law of criminal attempts, legislators could deal with the reluctance of 
fact finders to deduce liability in cases of incomplete attempts (i.e., cases involving 
the preparation-attempt boundary) by criminalizing preparatory acts. Once such 
acts are criminalized, fact finders are no longer asked to infer whether an attempt at 
a greater crime took place, and the anti-inference bias no longer plays a role. 
The Article is structured as follows. Following this brief introduction, Part I 
defines circumstantial evidence and surveys the extant explanations for the 
persistent reluctance to base criminal and civil liability on such evidence. Part II 
presents four new experiments designed to inquire whether this reluctance is unique 
to statistical, probabilistic, inconclusive, forensic, or non-case-specific evidence. 
Finally, Part III analyzes the contribution of our results to better understanding the 
behavior of fact finders, and discusses the potential normative implications of our 
findings. 
I. DOCTRINAL AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Direct evidence, if accepted, proves a material fact without the mediation of a 
deductive process. Circumstantial evidence, in contrast, even if accepted, requires 
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an additional mental step of inference in order to determine whether the material 
fact did or did not exist.6 The very existence of this distinction is, however, 
contested analytically. Some commentators argue that any determination of facts by 
judges or juries—including determination based on eyewitness testimony—
inevitably involves inferences.7 For example, from the fact that the witness testifies 
that she saw the accused stabbing the victim, and the fact finder’s impression that 
the witness is telling the truth, the fact finder infers that the accused actually 
stabbed the victim. According to this account, direct evidence is a myth.8 Direct 
evidence may thus be described as requiring a single inference (from the evidence 
to the material fact), while circumstantial evidence requires at least two: from the 
evidence to an underlying fact and from the underlying fact to the material one. 
Under any of these descriptions, elements of what is conventionally viewed as 
direct evidence are sometimes circumstantial. For instance, when a litigant takes 
the stand and testifies that she made an oral agreement with the defendant on a 
certain date, her testimony would ordinarily be viewed as direct evidence. 
However, typically much of this testimony will refer to the prior relationships 
between the parties and their subsequent behavior in order to corroborate the 
litigant’s assertion that the alleged agreement was actually made. These parts of her 
testimony are analytically circumstantial evidence.9 One may thus distinguish 
between evidence that is perceived as wholly circumstantial and evidence that is 
not. In addition, to some extent the distinction between the two types of evidence is 
a matter of degree: Some evidence requires more inferential steps than other 
evidence to draw a conclusion about the material fact. Often, judicial fact finding 
consists of several (possibly multistage) inferences, some independent and some 
interconnected, based on a multiplicity of evidence.10 
These complexities notwithstanding, the distinction between direct and 
circumstantial evidence is entrenched in popular and legal vocabulary. However 
analytically described or critiqued, this distinction has bearing on one’s perceptions 
and decisions. Inasmuch as people treat circumstantial evidence differently than 
direct evidence, this differentiation may have considerable ramifications in both 
                                                                                                                 
 
 6. 1 CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 308 (Kenneth S. Broun et al. 
eds., 6th, one-vol. ed. 2006); ALBERT J. MOORE, PAUL BERGMAN & DAVID A. BINDER, TRIAL 
ADVOCACY: INFERENCES, ARGUMENTS, AND TECHNIQUES 2–3 (1996); PETER MURPHY, 
MURPHY ON EVIDENCE 20–21 (10th ed. 2008). 
 7. See, e.g., WIGMORE, supra note 3, at 952–56. 
 8. See Greenstein, supra note 2. This position echoes the reductionist view in the 
philosophical debate over the epistemological problems of testimony. According to this 
view, a testimony is not an autonomous source of epistemic authority; rather, its reliability 
rests on additional sources of knowledge. See generally C.A.J. COADY, TESTIMONY: A 
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY (1992); Jonathan Adler, Epistemological Problems of Testimony, 
STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Aug. 27, 2012), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/testimony
-episprob. 
 9. MOORE ET AL., supra note 6, at 3–4; Paul Bergman, A Bunch of Circumstantial 
Evidence, 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 985, 988–89 (1996). 
 10. DAVID A. SCHUM, EVIDENCE AND INFERENCE FOR THE INTELLIGENCE ANALYST 
passim (1987) (using symbols and diagrams to describe complex inferential processes). 
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criminal and civil litigation, as often there is no direct evidence bearing on the 
disputed facts. 
As a doctrinal matter, some legal systems instruct, or used to instruct, fact 
finders to avoid convictions based exclusively on circumstantial evidence.11 Other 
legal systems have allowed fact finders to rely on such evidence, yet have required 
them to exercise special caution in both criminal and civil cases.12 At times, stricter 
limitations have been imposed on drawing an inference upon an inference—
namely, inferring the existence or nonexistence of a material fact from another fact 
that was itself inferred from other evidence. According to one version of this 
limitation, even in civil litigation, an inference upon an inference is impermissible, 
and according to another version it is only permitted if the first inference meets the 
“beyond a reasonable doubt” standard.13 
Clearly, the modern trend is to abandon rules limiting the use of circumstantial 
evidence, including an inference upon an inference.14 Instead, fact finders are 
instructed to determine the reliability and weight of any evidence, direct or indirect, 
without prejudice against the latter.15 Vestiges of the distrust of circumstantial 
evidence can nevertheless be found in jury instructions in some jurisdictions. Thus, 
for instance, the Mississippi Model Jury Instructions provide as follows: 
The court instructs the jury that if the State has relied on circumstantial 
evidence to establish its theory of guilt of the defendant, then the 
evidence for the State must be so strong as to establish the guilt of the 
defendant, not only beyond a reasonable doubt, but the evidence must 
                                                                                                                 
 
 11. See, e.g., Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, “Perhaps What Ye Say Is 
Based Only on Conjecture”—Circumstantial Evidence, Then and Now, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 
1371, 1376–90 (1995) (discussing Jewish law). 
 12. See, e.g., id. at 1390–402 (analyzing 19th century and current American law). 
 13. L. JONATHAN COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE 68−73 (1977) (discussing 
the difficulty in relying on inference upon inference); RICHARD EGGLESTON, EVIDENCE, 
PROOF AND PROBABILITY 35, 39–40, 237–40 (2d ed. 1983); WIGMORE, supra note 3, at 
1106–19 (critically surveying the case law); Michael Foster, A Review and Reconsideration 
of Florida’s Rule Against Basing an Inference on an Inference in Civil Cases, 23 STETSON L. 
REV. 743 (1994) (critically discussing the rule as applied in Florida). 
 14. See, e.g., EGGLESTON, supra note 13, at 35, 39–40, 237–40 (rejecting Cohen’s 
account of the law). On the roots of this trend in early modern English law, see BARBARA J. 
SHAPIRO, “BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT” AND “PROBABLE CAUSE”: HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVES ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW OF EVIDENCE 200–43 (1991). 
 15. See, e.g., Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954) (stating that, in terms 
of reliability, “[c]ircumstantial evidence . . . is intrinsically no different from testimonial 
evidence”); SIDNEY L. PHIPSON, PHIPSON ON EVIDENCE 5 (Hodge M. Malek et al. eds., 
Thomson Reuters 17th ed. 2010) (1892) (“Little is to be gained from a comparison of [direct 
and indirect evidence’s] weight, since . . . both forms admit of every degree of cogency from 
the lowest to the highest.”); WIGMORE, supra note 3, at 957–64, 1120–38 (surveying cases in 
which judges have repudiated the rule against basing an inference on an inference); 
Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 11, at 1400–02 (showing that most courts in the United 
States follow the Holland dictum). 
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be so strong as to exclude every other reasonable hypothesis other than 
that of guilt.16 
Similar instructions may be found in case law.17 In the same vein, while the rule 
restricting an inference upon an inference has largely been abandoned, it is still in 
force in some jurisdictions.18 
Commentators generally agree that the prejudice against circumstantial evidence 
is unwarranted.19 Yet, empirical and experimental studies have long demonstrated 
that fact finders are far more inclined to base their conclusions on direct evidence.20 
Fact finders sometimes tend to undervalue the reliability and probative value of 
circumstantial evidence, including statistical and forensic evidence,21 and to 
overvalue the trustworthiness and weight of direct evidence, such as eyewitness 
testimonies.22 
                                                                                                                 
 
 16. MISSISSIPPI MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS—CRIMINAL § 1:18 (Miss. Judicial Coll. 2012). 
See also Carl N. Hammarskjold, Smokes, Candy, and the Bloody Sword: How Classifying 
Jailhouse Snitch Testimony as Direct, Rather than Circumstantial, Evidence Contributes to 
Wrongful Convictions, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 1103, 1120–22 (2011) (describing the Mississippi 
instructions in a historical context). 
 17. See, e.g., Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 11, at 1399 (describing state courts that 
refused to follow the Holland ruling); see also PHIPSON, supra note 15, at 414 (citing 
approvingly the Judicial Studies Board Specimen Direction that calls for examining 
circumstantial evidence with care). 
 18. See, e.g., Stanley v. Marceaux, 991 So. 2d 938, 940 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting 
Nielsen v. City of Sarasota, 117 So. 2d 731, 733 (Fla. 1960) (discussing the rules governing the 
use of circumstantial evidence in civil cases); Foster, supra note 13 (critically analyzing the law 
in Florida). 
 19. See, e.g., PHIPSON, supra note 15, at 5; WIGMORE, supra note 3, at 957–64; Greenstein, 
supra note 2, at 1804 (questioning the very distinction between direct and circumstantial 
evidence). But see Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 11, at 1402–22 (criticizing the equation 
of the probative weight of circumstantial and direct evidence). 
 20. See Heller, supra note 1, at 250–52 (contending that “jurors consistently underestimate 
the probative value of [circumstantial forensic evidence]”). 
 21. Jane Goodman, Jurors’ Comprehension and Assessment of Probabilistic Evidence, 16 
AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 361, 375 (1992) (describing experimental findings indicating that “where 
the probabilistic evidence is most incriminating and most probative, jurors may tend to 
underuse or undervalue the evidence”); Dale A. Nance & Scott B. Morris, Juror Understanding 
of DNA Evidence: An Empirical Assessment of Presentation Formats for Trace Evidence with 
a Relatively Small Random-Match Probability, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 395, 407–18 (2005) 
(reporting the results of a large-scale empirical study indicating that jurors tend to undervalue 
forensic match evidence). 
 22. See, e.g., Heller, supra note 1, at 247–50, 253–54 (surveying the psychological 
literature and the data on false convictions); R.C.L. Lindsay, Gary L. Wells & Carolyn M. 
Rumpel, Can People Detect Eyewitness-Identification Accuracy Within and Across Situations?, 
66 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 79, 80–86 (1981) (reporting experimental results demonstrating that 
subjects who viewed the cross-examination of eyewitnesses were unable to distinguish between 
accurate and false identifications); Steven Penrod & Brian Cutler, Witness Confidence and 
Witness Accuracy: Assessing Their Forensic Relation, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 817, 817 
(1995) (“Jurors overbelieve eyewitnesses, have difficulty reliably differentiating accurate from 
inaccurate eyewitnesses, and are not adequately sensitive to aspects of witnessing and 
identification conditions.”). 
2014] THE ANTI-INFERENCE BIAS 201 
 
Several explanations have been offered for this phenomenon. One is that, unlike 
direct evidence, inferences are based on generalizations, “which by definition are 
accurate less than 100% of the time.”23 Even reliable circumstantial evidence may 
be compatible with numerous competing inferences; hence, it is necessarily 
“polyvocal,” to use the term coined by Kevin Heller.24 Unlike the first explanation, 
the second does not assume that circumstantial evidence is objectively less 
conclusive than direct evidence, yet it argues that circumstantial evidence may be 
subjectively perceived as such. Focusing on people’s reluctance to use statistical 
evidence as a basis for imposing liability, it has been argued that fact finders make 
decisions on the basis of subjective probability estimates, which may differ from 
the objective probability estimates.25 Fact finders may believe that the reliability 
and probative weight of circumstantial evidence is considerably lower than it 
actually is, and therefore be reluctant to rely on it (the opposite would hold for 
direct evidence). 
A third explanation focuses on the typical features of eyewitness testimonies, 
often atypical of circumstantial evidence. Among other things, eyewitness 
testimonies provide “a verbal representation of the crime itself,” whereas indirect 
evidence is often abstract.26 Direct evidence is a story-like narrative, while 
arguments based on circumstantial evidence often resemble deductive reasoning.27 
The former are often vivid, concrete, and stirring, while the latter are pallid, 
general, and unexciting.28 These characteristics make it easier for fact finders to 
form a coherent story of the events from direct evidence and, as a result, more 
likely to convict.29 
A fourth explanation, resonating with both the alleged generalization-based 
nature of circumstantial evidence (underlying the first explanation) and its 
nonconcrete quality (part of the third explanation), has to do with the case-
specificity of the evidence. A central justification for the reluctance to accept a 
claim on the basis of naked statistical evidence draws on the distinction between 
the probability that a certain fact is true and the weight or resiliency of the evidence 
supporting the claim. Decision makers may sensibly reject a claim even if the 
probability that the plaintiff’s version is correct meets the controlling standard of 
proof, if assessment of this probability rests on too little information or on general, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 23. Bergman, supra note 9, at 988. 
 24. Heller, supra note 1, at 267–68; see also MOORE ET AL., supra note 6, at 4–7 
(arguing that “circumstantial evidence frequently gives rise to multiple and even conflicting 
inferences”). 
 25. See William C. Thompson & Edward L. Schumann, Interpretation of Statistical 
Evidence in Criminal Trials: The Prosecutor’s Fallacy and the Defense Attorney’s Fallacy, 
11 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 167, 172–81 (1987) (experimentally demonstrating subjects’ errors 
in using probabilistic information); Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and 
Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1344–50 (1971). 
 26. Heller, supra note 1, at 265. 
 27. Id. at 265–66. 
 28. Id. at 267–80. 
 29. Cf. Nicholas Scurich & Richard S. John, Trawling Genetic Databases: When a DNA 
Match Is Just a Naked Statistic, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 49, 58–59 (2011) (discussing 
the “story model of juror decision making”). 
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non-case-specific evidence.30 For example, the fact that there were 1000 spectators 
in a rodeo but only 400 tickets had been sold means that for any spectator chosen at 
random, there is a 60% probability of her being a gatecrasher. The fact finder may 
nevertheless dismiss a claim based on this evidence alone as resting on too thin an 
evidentiary basis.31 
Yet another possibility is that from the perspective of the fact finders, decisions 
based on direct testimonies involve a smaller degree of responsibility. If it turns out 
that a testimony was inaccurate or deceptive, the fact finder can rationalize that the 
witness is to blame for the erroneous verdict. In contrast, if it transpires that 
liability was erroneously imposed due to a faulty inference from circumstantial 
evidence, the responsibility arguably lies with the fact finder.32 To avoid a feeling 
of regret, a fact finder would likely be disinclined to rely on circumstantial 
evidence.33 This explanation bears some similarity to the epistemological notion 
that when a speaker makes testimonial assertions, she undertakes responsibility for 
the accuracy of what she says; and when a hearer takes a speaker’s word for 
something, she ascribes her authority.34 
The sixth and seventh theories were originally offered in the context of naked 
statistical evidence and later extended by Kevin Heller to circumstantial evidence 
more generally.35 In a seminal study, Gary Wells conjectured that “in order for 
evidence to have a significant impact on people’s verdict preferences, one’s 
hypothetical belief about the ultimate fact must affect one’s belief about the 
evidence.”36 For example, the mere fact that 80% of the buses in a certain town 
                                                                                                                 
 
 30. For detailed discussions of this claim, primarily in the context of naked statistical 
evidence, see COHEN, supra note 13, at 36–39; ALEX STEIN, FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW 
40–56, 80–106 (2005); L. Jonathan Cohen, The Role of Evidential Weight in Criminal Proof, 
66 B.U. L. REV. 635 (1986); D.H. Kaye, Apples and Oranges: Confidence Coefficients and the 
Burden of Persuasion, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 54 (1987); Amit Pundik, What Is Wrong with 
Statistical Evidence? The Attempts to Establish an Epistemic Deficiency, 27 CIV. JUST. Q. 461, 
474–87 (2008) (criticizing the weight argument). 
 31. COHEN, supra note 13, at 74–76 (discussing the gatecrasher paradox); L. Jonathan 
Cohen, Subjective Probability and the Paradox of the Gatecrasher, 1981 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 627, 
627 (replying to reactions to his original analysis). 
 32. Heller, supra note 1, at 287. 
 33. For the claim that anticipation of possible ex post regret affects people’s decisions ex 
ante, see generally David E. Bell, Regret in Decision Making Under Uncertainty, 30 
OPERATIONS RES. 961 (1982); Richard P. Larrick & Terry L. Boles, Avoiding Regret in 
Decisions with Feedback: A Negotiation Example, 63 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION 
PROCESSES 87 (1995); Graham Loomes, Further Evidence of the Impact of Regret and 
Disappointment in Choice Under Uncertainty, 55 ECONOMICA 47 (1988); Graham Loomes & 
Robert Sugden, Regret Theory: An Alternative Theory of Rational Choice Under Uncertainty, 
92 ECON. J. 805, 809 (1982). 
 34. Adler, supra note 8 (surveying the philosophical literature); see also Arnon Keren, 
Epistemic Authority, Testimony and the Transmission of Knowledge, 4 EPISTEME 368, 368 
(2007) (arguing that “to trust a speaker is to grant her epistemic authority on the asserted 
proposition, and hence to see her opinion as issuing a second order, preemptive reason for 
believing the proposition”). 
 35. Heller, supra note 1. 
 36. Gary L. Wells, Naked Statistical Evidence of Liability: Is Subjective Probability 
Enough?, 62 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 739, 746 (1992) (quote italicized in original). 
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belong to the blue bus company and 20% to the grey bus company is insufficient to 
find the former liable for an accident caused by an unidentified bus, because the 
determination of liability would not change one’s belief about the accuracy of the 
statistical fact. The statistical data remains true whether or not a blue bus was 
involved in the accident. In contrast, when a weigh station attendant testifies that 
according to his records, a blue bus was weighed in the nearby station just before 
the accident—thus tying that bus company to the accident—the determination of 
liability would more likely bear on the reliability of this testimony, even if the 
defendant had already established that the records were wrong 20% of the time. In 
this case, determining which bus was involved in the accident does bear on the 
accuracy of the weigh station’s records and the reliability of the attendant’s 
testimony. 
The seventh and last explanation is inspired by Daniel Kahneman and Amos 
Tversky’s simulation heuristic. Kahneman and Tversky argued that the ease with 
which different scenarios can be simulated is used to judge the probability of 
specific events, to assess the causal connection between two events, and so forth. 37 
In the present context, Keith Niedermeier and his coauthors argued that the 
willingness to ground liability on statistical evidence depends on how easily one 
can imagine an alternative scenario that would be compatible with the evidence.38 
Arguably, it is easier to imagine such a scenario when the only evidence is 
circumstantial, since by its very nature, such evidence does not prove the material 
                                                                                                                 
 
 37. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, The Simulation Heuristic, in JUDGMENT UNDER 
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 201, 201–03 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & 
Amos Tversky eds., 1982). 
 38. Keith E. Niedermeier, Norbert L. Kerr & Lawrence A. Messé, Jurors’ Use of Naked 
Statistical Evidence: Exploring Bases and Implications of the Wells Effect, 76 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 533, 536–37 (1999); Scurich & John, supra note 29, at 58 
(discussing Niedermeier and his coauthors’ theory). Following the experimental design of 
Wells, supra note 36, Niedermeier and his coauthors presented the participants in their study 
with various vignettes describing a legal suit for damages. The lawsuit was filed by a woman 
whose dog was killed by a bus. In all the vignettes, there was an objective probability of 
80% that the defendant—one of the only two bus companies in the county—was responsible 
for the accident. In the “complete match” version, the evidence was based on a comparison 
between the tracks left by the bus that ran over the dog and the tracks of all the buses 
belonging to the two companies. Each company operated ten buses, and the track prints 
matched eight of the defendant’s buses and two buses belonging to the other company. In the 
“partial match” version, there was a partial match with only one of the defendant’s buses and 
one of the other company’s buses, indicating that there was an 80% probability that the 
defendant’s bus was the one that ran over the dog and a 20% chance that it was a bus 
belonging to the other company. The responders were asked to indicate whether they would 
accept the claim against the defendant—the blue bus company—and to assess the probability 
that the defendant’s bus was involved in the accident. While the assessed probability was 
similar under the two conditions, the willingness to accept the claim was much lower in the 
complete-match condition, arguably because in that case it was easier to imagine that the dog 
had been killed by one of the other company’s two buses whose tracks matched those left by 
the bus that had run over the dog. Id.; cf. Heller, supra note 1, at 258–303 (extending the 
ease-of-simulation explanation and applying it to circumstantial evidence generally). 
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fact itself.39 Hence, fact finders are considerably less willing to find defendants 
liable on the basis of such evidence. This explanation is associated with the third 
explanation discussed above, as direct evidence helps the fact finder to form a 
coherent story of the events, which then makes it harder to imagine an alternative 
story. In the same vein, Deanna Sykes and Joel Johnson argued that since 
comprehension of a witness’s assertion entails an initial belief in that assertion, 
undoing the mental representation created by the testimony and imagining an 
alternative scenario requires cognitive effort.40 Such an effort is not required when 
decision makers are presented with probabilistic evidence that does not include a 
concrete assertion that needs to be undone.41 
All of these explanations can be—and have been—challenged. Thus, for 
example, the generality of the subjective probability argument (the second 
explanation) was called into question by Wells, who instead offered the fact-to-
evidence theory.42 Wells’s theory was in turn challenged by Niedermeier, Kerr, and 
Messé and Sykes and Johnson, who proposed the ease-of-simulation explanation.43 
The ease-of-simulation explanation was subsequently called into question by Arkes 
et al.44 As the experiments in the next Part demonstrate, none of these arguments 
captures the full scope of the bias against indirect evidence. 
II. EXPERIMENTAL FINDINGS 
To test the scope of fact finders’ aversion towards circumstantial evidence, we 
conducted a series of four experimental surveys using situational vignettes on a 
student population. In three of the four studies we employed a between-subject 
design. That is, participants were randomly assigned to one of several equally sized 
groups and given a questionnaire structured around a hypothetical case. Whereas 
half of them read a case in which the evidence described was direct in nature, the 
other half read a similar case in which the evidence was indirect. Participants were 
then asked a series of questions focusing on their willingness to assign legal 
liability based on the described evidence. In order to broaden the methodological 
robustness of our studies, in one of them we employed a within- (rather than 
between-) subject design. According to this framework all participants were 
presented with both types of evidence and were asked to choose between them. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 39. Cf. Heller, supra note 1, at 258–66 (describing the different applications of the ease-
of-simulation model to direct and circumstantial evidence). 
 40. Deanna L. Sykes & Joel T. Johnson, Probabilistic Evidence Versus the 
Representation of an Event: The Curious Case of Mrs. Prob’s Dog, 21 BASIC & APPLIED 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 199 (1999). 
 41. Id. at 209–10. 
 42. Wells, supra note 36, at 742, 746. 
 43. Niedermeier et al., supra note 38, at 534, 536–37; Sykes & Johnson, supra note 40, 
at 200–01. 
 44. Hal R. Arkes, Brittany Shoots-Reinhard & Ryan S. Mayes, Disjunction Between 
Probability and Verdict in Juror Decision Making, 25 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 276, 
277–78 (2012). 
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A. Experiment 1 (“Highway”): Conviction Based on Technological Evidence  
Since much of the existing literature on circumstantial evidence focuses on criminal 
liability, Experiment 1 was designed to examine how the type of evidence impacts the 
willingness to impose such liability—namely, convicting a driver of a traffic violation. 
Specifically, the experiment examined the difference between evidence that directly 
establishes the defendant’s fault and evidence that establishes fault indirectly, requiring 
an additional inferential step. The experiment held constant the nature of the evidence 
involved—both scenarios alluded to technological evidence. Furthermore, it controlled 
for the objective reliability of the evidence by supplying subjects with information 
regarding the error rates of the enforcement technology. 
We used a between-subject design, assigning each participant randomly to one of 
two versions of a short scenario. The direct-evidence condition read as follows: 
Speed cameras were installed on a toll road. The probability of an error in 
the camera system is 2%. The speed limit on this road is 100 KPH. 
According to the camera, a driver drove his car at a speed of 125 KPH late 
at night. 
The inference condition was as follows: 
Cameras that document the exact time at which each vehicle passes by 
them were installed on a toll road. The cameras do not document the speed 
of the passing vehicle, but from the distance between the cameras and the 
time that elapses between the points they document, it is possible to infer 
the driver’s speed in that section of the road. The probability of an error in 
the camera system is 2%. The speed limit on this road is 100 KPH. 
According to the time elapsed and the distance between the two cameras, 
a driver drove his car at a speed of 125 KPH late at night. 
Note that while the enforcement technology in the two conditions differed, the text 
describing the objective probability of error was identical irrespective of how many 
cameras were employed (i.e., “[t]he probability of an error in the camera system is 
2%”). 
After reading the scenario, responders were reminded that the standard of proof in 
such cases is “beyond a reasonable doubt.” Based on this evidentiary threshold they 
were then asked to indicate whether they would convict the driver of violating the 
speed limit. The responses to this dichotomous question constituted the main 
dependent variable of the experiment.45 In addition, in order to probe deeper into 
participants’ decision-making processes, we asked them two additional follow-up 
questions. Respondents who decided affirmatively with respect to the liability question 
were asked to indicate the penalty they would impose on the driver. The penalty could 
range from 50 NIS to 1000 NIS (1 NIS roughly equals $0.25). Finally, all responders 
were asked to rate the fairness of conviction on the basis of the evidence presented, 
using a scale of 0 to 100, where 0 indicates “absolutely unfair” and 100 “absolutely 
fair.” 
                                                                                                                 
 
 45. “Dependent variable” refers to the variables that are explained by the model. 
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The two questionnaires were posted on a website designed for controlled judgment 
and decision-making experiments. Responders were recruited by an e-mail message 
sent to students at the Faculty of Law of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. To 
encourage participation, one out of ten participants was randomly selected to win a 
prize of 100 NIS (approximately $25). A total of 88 law students (57 women, 31 men) 
who had finished their first year of studies participated in the study.46 These students 
ranged in age from 19 to 40, with a mean of 24. 
The dependent variable—rate of convictions—differed significantly by condition.47 
Whereas 81.4% of the responders in the direct-evidence condition decided to convict 
the driver, only 60% of the responders in the inference condition did.48 Even though 
both groups faced the same objective probability, and even though both groups faced a 
similar situation involving a technological enforcement mechanism, respondents were 
far more likely to convict when supplied with direct evidence.49 
A more nuanced picture emerged when two follow-up questions were considered. 
Counting acquittals as a fine of zero, the average fine in the direct evidence group was 
300.3 NIS, and the average fine in the inference group was 286.2 NIS. These averages, 
however, were not significantly affected by condition.50 The mean fairness rating of 
convicting the driver in the direct-evidence condition (74.8 on a scale of 0 to 100, 
where 0 is “absolutely unfair” and 100 “absolutely fair”) was higher than in the 
inference condition (66.1 on the same scale). Nonetheless, this difference was only 
marginally statistically significant.51 The willingness to convict in the two conditions 
was correlated with the judged fairness of conviction, so that controlling for the 
judgment of fairness eliminated the effect of condition (direct vs. inference evidence) 
                                                                                                                 
 
 46. In Israel, law is studied at the undergraduate level, with students earning an LLB. 
 47. A significant effect in a statistical measurement refers to the odds that a certain 
result was created by chance. In the context of this paper, every time a difference or a result 
is presented as “significant,” it means that there is less than a 5% likelihood that this 
difference was coincidental. The 5% level of significance is a common threshold used in 
statistical analysis in the social sciences. A 6% to 10% level of significance is commonly 
considered marginally significant. In technical terms results are significant when the p-value 
associated with them is 0.05 or below. 
 48. Chi-Square=4.835, p=0.028. A chi-square procedure can be used to test the 
hypothesis that two different outcomes were obtained by chance. Here we use it to test the 
conviction rates in the two conditions. Specifically, we aim to reject the hypothesis that the 
difference in the two rates arose due to chance. 
 49. Both gender and age had no statistically significant main effects and no significant 
interactions with the experimental conditions (in this or in any of the following experiments). 
 50. p=0.832. Similarly, the average fine excluding the acquittals did not significantly 
differ between the two conditions (368.9 vs. 477.0 for direct evidence and inference, 
respectively, t(60)=1.472, p=0.15). 
 51. t(86)=1.64, p=0.1. 
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on conviction rate.52 However, as will be discussed below, it is unclear what one can 
make of this finding.53 
B. Experiment 2 (“Enforcement”): Ex Ante Policy Making 
Experiment 2 set out to deepen our understanding of the disinclination to base 
legal liability on indirect evidence by exploring whether the results obtained in the 
first experiment, which focused on an ex post judicial decision, would be replicated 
with respect to an ex ante choice of an enforcement system. The shift from an ex 
post to an ex ante perspective can prove helpful from both substantive and 
methodological perspectives. From a substantive perspective, as noted above, one 
explanation of the disinclination to base liability on circumstantial evidence alludes 
to the issue of the responsibility of the fact finder for an erroneous judicial outcome 
when she wrongfully deduces liability.54 Once the decision is shifted to the policy 
context, it is difficult to see any true difference between direct and circumstantial 
evidence regarding the responsibility of the policy maker. From a methodological 
perspective, the move to a policy question enabled us to employ an alternative 
experimental design. Rather than assigning participants randomly to one of two 
conditions and comparing the two, we employed a within-subject design in which 
subjects revealed their preferences regarding the different types of evidence. Earlier 
research suggests that, for the same set of options, tasks that rest on isolated 
judgments and tasks that call for comparative judgment may yield different 
rankings.55 Replicating the results of the first experiment (between-subject design) 
in a within-subject design (the second experiment) could thus bolster our findings. 
Participants in Experiment 2 were instructed to imagine that they were members 
of a team of experts whose job is to set policy regarding the enforcement of traffic 
laws. They were then asked to choose between two speed-enforcement systems. 
One system was based on speed-enforcement cameras, as in the direct-evidence 
condition of Experiment 1. The other system was based on two cameras 
documenting the exact time at which a car passes by, from which it is possible to 
infer the driver’s speed, as in the inference condition of Experiment 1. The cost of 
purchasing, installing, and operating the two systems was identical, and the 
accuracy of both systems was 99%. In order to avoid any potential effect that might 
be caused by the label attached to each system, we simply named them A and B. 
Furthermore, to assure that decisions were not influenced by the order in which 
                                                                                                                 
 
 52. Predicting conviction decision by a logistic regression analysis that includes both the 
condition (direct evidence vs. inference as a dummy variable, coded as 1 for direct evidence 
and 0 for inference condition) and fairness judgments as independent variables renders the 
effect of the condition nonsignificant (B=.782, Wald=1.422, p=.233 and B=.072, 
Wald=20.696, p<.001 for condition and fairness, respectively). 
 53. See infra notes 97–99 and accompanying text. 
 54. See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text. 
 55. See generally Christopher K. Hsee, George F. Loewenstein, Sally Blount & Max H. 
Bazerman, Preference Reversals Between Joint and Separate Evaluations of Options: A 
Review and Theoretical Analysis, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 576 (1999) (reviewing the literature 
and proposing an explanation for the phenomenon of preference reversal between joint and 
separate evaluations). 
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participants read about the two systems, the order was varied randomly between 
subjects. 
Responders were given three options: preference for system A, preference for 
system B, and indifference. Responders with a preference for one of the two 
systems were then asked whether they would stick with their choice even if it was 
98% accurate and the other system remained 99% accurate. Finally, they were 
asked to indicate the lowest level of accuracy at which they would still choose their 
preferred system over the alternative, assuming the other remained 99% accurate. 
Participants in Experiment 2 were recruited voluntarily in one of their law 
classes. A total of 49 first-year students participated in the study (31 women, 18 
men). Their ages ranged from 18 to 32, with a mean of 23. 
The results of the experiment confirmed the existence of a bias against 
circumstantial evidence. Of the 49 responders, 53.1% preferred the “direct-
evidence system,” 24.5% preferred the “inference system,” and 22.4% were 
indifferent. The percent of responders who preferred the direct-evidence system 
was significantly higher than the percent preferring the inference one.56 
Of the 26 responders who preferred the direct-evidence system, 11 would have 
preferred it even if it was 98% accurate and 13 would not (two did not answer this 
question). The mean lowest accuracy they would accept was 95.2%. Of the 12 
responders who preferred the inference system, 8 would have preferred it even if it 
was 98% accurate and 4 would not. The mean lowest accuracy they would accept 
was 92.2%. Although these findings may suggest that subjects, who overcame the 
anti-inference bias and preferred the indirect-evidence enforcement regime, 
exhibited a stronger preference for this technology relative to the subjects who 
preferred the direct-evidence regime, neither the choice proportion nor the 
threshold for preference change were significantly different when comparing the 
two groups.57 
C. Experiment 3 (“Bus”): Conviction Based on Eyewitness Testimony 
Experiment 3 was designed to further examine how general the findings of 
Experiments 1 and 2 were along several dimensions. First, we wanted to investigate 
whether the results were due to any unique feature of the pertinent enforcement 
mechanisms. For example, one could conjecture that responders were reluctant to 
convict in the inference condition because the two-camera system might have been 
perceived as more intrusive and a greater threat to people’s privacy. Thus, 
Experiment 3 was designed in a way that such potential issues would not arise. 
Second, we wanted to see whether the results of Experiment 1 were a function 
of the technological nature of the evidence or whether they would hold for 
eyewitness testimony as well. Much of the literature on direct versus circumstantial 
evidence deals with the distinction between eyewitness—the paradigmatic direct 
                                                                                                                 
 
 56. z=2.953, p<0.01. The order of presentation did not significantly affect preference 
(Chi-Square=1.414, p=0.493). Thus, we could treat all subjects as one group. Z-test is the 
standard statistical test for comparison of means or proportions. 
 57. More specifically, the p-values were p=.231 and p=.386 for the comparison of the 
choice proportions and the preference change threshold, respectively. 
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evidence—and forensic, indirect evidence.58 To control for the explanatory force of 
this distinction, Experiment 1 held constant the technological nature of the 
evidence across both experimental conditions. Similarly, in Experiment 3 both the 
direct evidence group and the inference group were presented with eyewitness 
testimony. 
Third, we wanted to test whether the results are driven by the responders’ 
subjective probability estimates. While the design of Experiments 1 and 2 held the 
objective probability of a blameworthy behavior constant, subjects might have 
assigned different subjective probabilities notwithstanding.59 In order to control for 
this somewhat elusive factor, we asked subjects not only to decide whether to 
convict the accused but also to assess the probability of guilt. 
Finally, we were interested in examining whether the difference between the 
two conditions in Experiment 1 had to do with the perceived responsibility-taking 
of the decision maker.60 Thus, instead of asking participants how they would decide 
the case, we asked them how a judge should decide the case. Presumably, shifting 
the act of making a decision to a third party should diminish the responsibility 
subjects feel towards their choices. 
As in Experiment 1, this experiment used a between-subject design, employing 
two versions of a short scenario, followed by a few questions. The two versions 
described a tourist bus that was stuck in a sparsely populated area late in the 
evening. A policeman who arrived on the scene assisted the driver in arranging for 
minibuses to bring the tourists to their destination. In the direct-evidence condition, 
the policeman, who got on the bus, saw that there were fifty-four tourists on it, 
despite the fact that its permit allowed it to carry only fifty passengers. In the 
inference condition, two minibuses arrived empty, were completely filled up, and 
drove away. It then turned out that four tourists were left, and an additional vehicle 
was summoned for them. Since each minibus had seats for twenty-five passengers, 
the policeman inferred that the bus driver had violated the terms of the permit, 
which allowed only fifty passengers on the bus. In both scenarios, based on the 
policeman’s report, the driver was accused of carrying too many passengers. The 
driver pleaded not guilty. The judge had the impression that the policeman was a 
reliable person and estimated the likelihood that he had miscounted the passengers 
as very low: one in twenty. As elsewhere, the exact same wording was used in both 
conditions to describe the possibility of error.61 
                                                                                                                 
 
 58. For a review of the literature on this point, see supra notes 26–29, 32–34 and 
accompanying text. 
 59. For a review of the literature on this point, see supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 60. For a review of the literature on this point, see supra notes 32–34 and accompanying 
text. 
 61. The vignette did not detail how the policeman knew that there were twenty-five 
passenger seats in each minibus, that the minibuses arrived empty, and that the minibuses 
were full when they set out. However, since these facts were presented as given, they should 
not have affected the reliability of the policeman’s inference. At any rate, the reliability of 
the policeman’s count, as assessed by the judge, was described identically in both conditions 
in order to eliminate any effect of such hypothetical doubts about the judged probability of 
the driver’s guilt. 
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After being reminded of the standard of proof in criminal proceedings (“beyond 
a reasonable doubt”), participants were asked whether in their opinion the judge 
should find the driver guilty. Much like in the Experiment 1, the responses to this 
dichotomous question constituted the main dependent variable of the experiment. 
Following this question, participants were asked to assess the probability that the 
driver had actually transported more passengers than permitted. This second 
question allowed us to collect data regarding subjects’ subjective valuation of the 
probability of guilt. Finally, participants were asked to rate the fairness of 
convicting the driver on a scale of 1 to 9. 
Participants in the third experiment were recruited voluntarily in one of their law 
classes. A total of 117 first-year law students (59 women, 58 men) answered the 
questionnaire during the first week of their studies. They ranged in age from 18 to 
36, with a mean of 23. Each participant was randomly assigned to one of the two 
conditions.  
The results of the third experiment confirmed the existence of an anti-inference 
bias yet again. Whereas 64.8% of the participants in the direct-evidence condition 
determined that the judge should convict the driver, only 38.1% of the participants 
in the inference condition were of this opinion. This result reflects a highly 
significant difference between the two groups.62 
Analyzing responders’ subjective valuations regarding liability sheds additional 
light on these findings. The participants estimated the probability of the driver 
actually violating the terms of the permit as considerably lower than the probability 
implied by the vignette. While the chance of miscounting according to the judge’s 
impression was described as one in twenty, implying a 95% reliability of the 
testimony, the mean estimated probability of the driver actually committing the 
violation was 80.1% across the two conditions. More importantly, the mean 
probability estimates were not significantly different for the two conditions: 82.2% 
and 78.3% for direct-evidence and inference conditions, respectively.63 
Furthermore, although—as one would expect—the probability estimate affected 
the conviction decision, it did not mediate the effect of the condition. A logistic 
regression analysis64 predicting the conviction decision based on the condition 
subjects were assigned to (direct evidence vs. inference) and their subjectively 
estimated probability yielded significant effects of both probability and condition.65 
In other words, the tendency to convict remained significantly lower in the 
circumstantial evidence condition, even when controlling for the estimated 
probability of guilt. As in Experiment 1, the effect of the condition, direct evidence 
versus inference, on the conviction decisions was possibly mediated by the effect of 
this factor on judged fairness.66 It is also possible, however, that the similar effects 
                                                                                                                 
 
 62. Chi-Square=8.304, p=0.004. 
 63. p=0.29. 
 64. Regression analysis is a method that enables documenting the way in which each of 
the independent variables influences the value of the dependent variable. 
 65. B=1.091, Wald=7.092, p<.01 and B=0.038, Wald=11.097, p<0.01 for the effects of 
the condition and the subjective probability, respectively. 
 66. Convicting the driver was perceived as fairer in the direct-evidence condition than in 
the inference condition: mean ratings of 6.09 and 4.70 for direct evidence and inference, 
respectively, on a scale of 1 to 9, where 1 is “absolutely unfair” and 9 “absolutely fair” 
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of the condition on the decision to convict and on the perceived fairness of the 
conviction reflect two outcomes of the same cognitive process.67 
D. Experiment 4 (“Antibiotics”): Forensic Evidence in Civil Litigation 
The fourth and final experiment aimed to deal with numerous additional issues 
that were not fully addressed in the first three experiments. First, it broadened our 
focus to include civil litigation. Civil litigation is distinct from criminal litigation 
along several key issues. Of specific relevance to this project is the different 
evidentiary threshold employed in civil litigation—preponderance of the 
evidence.68 Arguably, the decision threshold might interact with heuristics 
associated with the treatment of evidence. For example, people might be more open 
towards basing liability on inferences when only money is on the table and when 
the plaintiff is only required to establish the case with a probability exceeding 0.5. 
Thus, an experiment focusing on a civil dispute allows for a greater generalization 
of our findings. 
Second, Experiment 4 extended the inquiry to a case where the question was not 
whether a wrong had been committed, but rather who had committed it. As the 
evidence literature has shown, uncertainty regarding the nature of the act and 
uncertainty regarding the identity of the one who committed it generate distinct 
effects on the incentives to engage in the regulated behavior.69 Hence, fact finders’ 
behavior with respect to the two types of uncertainty might possibly differ. 
Third, as noted above, some jurisdictions set particularly strict limits on drawing 
an inference upon an inference.70 In order to explore whether fact finders share this 
aversion toward sequential inferences, the present experiment compared not only 
direct and indirect evidence, but also single and double inference. Furthermore, the 
comparison between single and double inference allowed us to extend our 
                                                                                                                 
(t(115)=3.005, p=.003). Across the two conditions, probability estimates were significantly 
correlated with fairness judgment (r=.279, p<.01). The effect of condition (type of evidence) 
on fairness judgment was not mediated by probability estimates. A regression analysis 
predicting fairness judgment by condition (direct evidence vs. inference) and subjectively 
estimated probability yielded significant effects with respect to both probability and 
condition (F(114)=7.829, p<.01 and F(114)=8.508, p<.01 for the effects of the condition and 
the subjective probability, respectively). As regards the relationship between the conviction 
decision and the judged fairness, predicting conviction decision by a logistic regression 
analysis that includes both condition (direct evidence vs. inference) and fairness judgment as 
independent variables renders the effect of condition nonsignificant (B=1.278, Wald=30.291, 
p<.001 and B=.719, Wald=1.090, p=.297 for the effects of fairness and condition, 
respectively). Thus, the difference between the two conditions with respect to conviction rate 
is no longer significant when we control for judged fairness. 
 67. See infra notes 97–99 and accompanying text. 
 68. See generally MCCORMICK, supra note 6, at 568–69; Eyal Zamir & Ilana Ritov, Loss 
Aversion, Omission Bias, and the Burden of Proof in Civil Litigation, 41 J. LEGAL STUD. 
165, 171–82 (2012) (experimentally examining the actual standard of proof in civil 
litigation). 
 69. See Henrik Lando, Does Wrongful Conviction Lower Deterrence?, 35 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 327, 329–30 (2006) (distinguishing between mistakes about the act and mistakes 
about identity). 
 70. See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text. 
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understanding of the role of complexity with respect to fact finders’ attitude 
towards circumstantial evidence. Arguably, since a double inference scenario is 
more complex than a single inference scenario, complexity would suggest a lower 
willingness to convict based on a double inference. If, however, fact finders’ main 
concern is the type of evidence (direct or circumstantial), then one would not 
necessarily expect a significant difference between the willingness to convict based 
on a single or double inference. 
Finally, Experiment 4 allowed us to broaden our pool of subjects. While the 
participants in the previous experiments were first-year law students (or students 
who completed their first year of legal studies), participants in the present 
experiment were advanced law students, including master’s candidates (many of 
whom are practicing lawyers). Extending the group of subjects to more diverse 
populations helps alleviate some of the concerns regarding the external validity of 
experimental findings. 
We used a between-subject design, employing three versions of a vignette 
describing a civil action, followed by three questions. Responders were asked to 
imagine that they were serving as a judge in a suit for damages filed by a small 
dairy against a dairy farmer. The farmer sells the dairy the milk he produces. 
According to the contract, the farmer should make sure that there are no antibiotics 
residues in the milk, because such residues obstruct the production of various 
products. The milk is delivered to the dairy by a tank truck that transports the milk 
of two farmers. Since the milk of the two farmers is mixed in the tank, a sample is 
taken from each farmer’s milk before pumping it into the tanker, and the samples 
are delivered to a laboratory, where they will be examined should a problem arise. 
The dairy claims that the farmer provided milk containing antibiotics residues and, 
as a consequence, yogurt production failed and the dairy had to discard all of the 
raw materials it had used in this process. As a result, the dairy suffered a loss of 
30,000 NIS. 
In the direct-evidence condition, when the yogurt-production process failed, the 
milk samples of the two farmers were examined. This examination revealed that 
there were antibiotics residues in the defendant’s milk and no residues in the other 
farmer’s milk. The probability that the results of the laboratory examinations are 
correct (that is, that there were antibiotics residues in the defendant’s milk but not 
in the other farmer’s milk) is 85%. It is undisputed that the source of the antibiotics 
residues could only be milk from one of the farmers.71 
In the single-inference condition, when the yogurt-production process failed, the 
milk samples from the two farmers were about to be examined (here too, it was 
undisputed that the source of the antibiotics residues could only be milk from one 
of them), but it turned out that the sample of the defendant’s milk had been lost in 
the laboratory and, therefore, it was only possible to examine the other farmer’s 
sample. This examination showed no antibiotics residues. The probability that the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 71. Arguably, both litigants’ acknowledgement that the production failure was caused 
by their milk may be a product of an inferential process in which other conceivable causes 
were considered and eliminated. However, in both actual litigation and laboratory 
experiments, when a fact is “undisputed,” fact finders and responders need not, and most 
likely do not, question the basis of the agreed-upon facts. 
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results of the laboratory examination are correct (that is, that there were no 
antibiotics residues in the other farmer’s milk) is 85%. 
In the double-inference condition, when the yogurt-production process failed, 
the first possibility examined was that the failure was due to other substances added 
to the milk during the process. This examination revealed that none of the other 
substances were tainted. When the milk samples from the two farmers were then 
about to be examined (here again, it was undisputed that the source of the 
antibiotics residues could only be milk from one of the farmers), it turned out that 
the sample of the defendant’s milk had been lost in the laboratory and, therefore, it 
was only possible to examine the other farmer’s sample. This examination showed 
no antibiotics residues. The probability that the results of the laboratory 
examinations are correct (that is, that the production failure was not caused by other 
substances or by antibiotics residues in the other farmer’s milk) is 85%. Based on 
the test results of the other substances, the dairy claims that one should infer that 
the milk caused the failure of the yogurt-production process, and, based on the 
results relating to the other farmer’s sample, one should infer that the defendant 
was the one responsible. 
Given the somewhat greater complexity of the design of this experiment, special 
attention was given to the wording of the probability of error so as to assure that the 
conditions did not differ along this dimension. This was achieved by describing the 
reliability of the laboratory tests in a way that very clearly referred to the entire 
testing process.72 
After reading the scenario, responders were asked (1) whether they would accept 
the claim, (2) what their assessment of the probability that there were antibiotics 
residues in the defendant’s milk was, and (3) how they would rate the fairness of 
accepting the claim. The three questionnaires were posted on the same website, and 
participants were recruited in the same way as in Experiment 1. To encourage 
participation, four participants were randomly selected to win a prize of 150 NIS 
each. Responders were randomly assigned to one of the three conditions. A total of 
193 advanced LLB and LLM students responded to the questionnaire (100 women, 
93 men). They ranged in age from 19 to 58, with a mean of 26. 
We began analyzing the results by comparing the double-inference group with 
the single-inference group. The rate of accepting claims—37% in the double-
inference condition and 44% in the single-inference condition—did not differ 
significantly between the two groups.73 Neither did the subjective estimates of 
liability. While the estimated probability of the existence of antibiotics residues in 
the defendant’s milk was 65.2% in the double-inference group, it was 64.3% in the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 72. The three descriptions were as follows. Direct Evidence: “The probability that the 
results of the laboratory examinations are correct (that is, that there were antibiotics residues 
in the defendant’s milk and no such remains in the other farmer’s milk) is 85%”; Single 
Inference: “The probability that the results of the laboratory examinations are correct (that is, 
that there were no antibiotics residues in the other farmer’s milk) is 85%”; Double Inference: 
“The probability that the results of the laboratory examinations are correct (that is, that the 
failure of production was not caused by the other substances or by antibiotics residues in the 
other farmer’s milk) is 85%.” 
 73. p=0.4. 
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single-inference group.74 Given the lack of difference between the single- and 
double-inference conditions, we collapsed the data across the two inference 
conditions and compared the direct-evidence results to those of the combined-
inference conditions. 
The rate of accepting the claim differed significantly between the direct-
evidence and the inference groups. Whereas 81.7% of the participants in the direct-
evidence condition accepted the claim, only 40.2% in the inference conditions did. 
This difference is highly statistically significant.75 The estimated probability of the 
existence of antibiotics residues in the defendant’s milk differed significantly 
between the two conditions as well. While the mean estimate in the direct-evidence 
condition was 81.7%, the equivalent figure with respect to the inference conditions 
was only 64.8%.76 Not surprisingly, across all conditions, participants who 
indicated that they would accept the claim evaluated the probability of the presence 
of antibiotics residues in the defendant’s milk higher than participants who did not 
accept the claim (80.6% and 69.1%, respectively).77 
Nonetheless, although the subjective probability estimates are closely related to 
the decision to accept the claim, the difference between the conditions with respect 
to the tendency to accept the claim was not mediated by the difference in 
probability estimates. A logistic regression predicting the decision to accept the 
claim from probability estimate and condition (direct evidence vs. inference, coded 
as in Experiment 1) yielded significant effects with respect to both factors.78 In 
other words, the tendency to assign legal liability remained significantly lower in 
the circumstantial evidence condition even when controlling for fact finders’ 
subjective probability estimates.79 As in Experiment 3, the effect of condition, 
direct evidence versus inference, was possibly mediated by the effect of this factor 
on judged fairness.80 
                                                                                                                 
 
 74. p=0.8. 
 75. Chi-Square=31.328, p<0.001. 
 76. t(191)=6.663, p<0.001. 
 77. t(191)=8.119, p<0.001. 
 78. B=.054, Wald=25.666, and B=1.296, Wald=10.976, for probability estimate and 
condition, respectively, with p<.01 for both factors. 
 79. These results differ from the results of the second experiment reported by Arkes et 
al., supra note 44, at 282–84. In that experiment, Arkes and his coauthors used vignettes 
similar to the tire-tracks scenario of Wells’s experiment, supra note 36, at 743, yet while in 
one condition the witness found that the tire tracks matched the blue bus company vehicles, 
in the other the witness found that the tracks did not match the grey bus company vehicles. 
In both conditions, the technique used was correct 80% of the time. Responders’ willingness 
to impose liability on the blue bus company was more than twice as great in the first 
condition, and this difference was mediated by their different probability assessments. In 
other experiments Arkes and his coauthors describe, the verdict was affected by various 
factors without being mediated by the assessed probability. Arkes et al., supra note 44, at 
280–82 and 285–88. 
 80. Predicting a decision to accept the claim by a logistic regression analysis that 
includes both condition (direct evidence vs. inference) and fairness judgment as independent 
variables renders the effect of condition nonsignificant ( B=1.509, Wald=54.372, p<.001 and 
B=.445, Wald=.551, p=.458 for the effects of fairness and condition, respectively). 
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III. DISCUSSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
This Part examines the contribution of our findings to the legal literature. We 
first outline our main results and discuss them in light of existing theories regarding 
the prevalent dissimilar treatment of direct and circumstantial evidence. That done, 
we turn to review the potential normative implications that can be drawn from 
them. Finally, we highlight some of the limitations of the study and sketch out 
paths for future research. 
A. General Discussion 
All four experiments demonstrated an anti-inference bias: the respondents were 
far more reluctant to impose liability based solely on circumstantial evidence than 
on direct evidence. This reluctance was manifest across different scenarios; was 
true for both criminal and civil liability; was common to technological, scientific, 
and eyewitness evidence; and was evident both when the disputed question was 
whether a wrong had been committed and when the question was who had 
committed the wrong. In all four experiments, the anti-inference bias characterized 
case-specific circumstantial evidence rather than merely statistical evidence. We 
found a strong disinclination to base liability on circumstantial evidence in both 
between- and within-subject experimental designs; in both ex post judicial decision 
making and ex ante policy making; and both when responders made the decision 
themselves and when they specified how another person should decide. This was 
true of students at the beginning of their first year of law school and of advanced 
LLB and LLM students. Furthermore, while the type of evidence, direct or 
circumstantial, sometimes affected the subjectively assessed probability of the 
defendant’s fault, in none of the experiments did it mediate the effect of the type of 
evidence on the decision whether to impose liability. 
As the following analysis demonstrates, our findings extend the existing 
literature on circumstantial evidence. While the explanations for the differential 
treatment accorded to circumstantial evidence put forward by this body of literature 
might be valid, they cannot account for the full scope of this phenomenon. The 
experiments suggest that there is another aspect of human decision making that is 
driving fact finders’ behavior. 
The first body of explanations highlighted by the existing literature focuses on 
objective probabilities or on fact finders’ subjective probability assessments.81 Our 
findings, however, suggest that these factors cannot fully account for people’s 
reluctance to impose legal liability based on indirect evidence. In Experiment 1 
(Highway), Experiment 3 (Bus), and Experiment 4 (Antibiotics), the objective 
probability that the defendant had committed the act attributed to him was identical 
in the direct-evidence and the inference conditions, yet the responders’ willingness 
to impose legal liability differed markedly. In the same vein, despite the identical 
accurateness of the two enforcement systems in Experiment 2 (Enforcement), the 
responders strongly preferred the direct-evidence system over the inference one. 
The assumption that circumstantial evidence is inherently less conclusive than 
                                                                                                                 
 
 81. See supra notes 23–25 and accompanying text. 
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direct evidence thus cannot explain the prevalent disinclination to impose liability 
based on such evidence. 
As for subjective probability assessments, despite the fact that there was no 
significant difference between responders’ mean probability assessments in the two 
conditions in Bus, about 65% of the responders found the driver guilty of violating 
the terms of the permit in the direct-evidence condition, but only 38% did so in the 
inference condition. In Antibiotics, while there were significant differences in the 
subjective probability assessments between the two conditions, these differences 
did not mediate the difference in the responders’ willingness to accept the claim 
under the two conditions, as this difference remained significant even when we 
controlled for the differences in probability assessments. In this regard, our findings 
are in line with previous results;82 yet, they generalize the previous results and 
expose a wide-ranging bias against circumstantial evidence that is not limited to the 
context of statistical and forensic evidence. In all of our experiments, conditions 
differed with regard to the directness of the evidence, but not with regard to 
whether the evidence was statistical, scientific, or eyewitness. Our findings also 
extend the previous experimental findings in covering criminal cases (Highway, 
Enforcement, and Bus) in addition to civil ones (Antibiotics); an ex ante choice 
between enforcement systems (Enforcement) in addition to ex post judicial 
decisions (Highway, Bus, and Antibiotics); and within-subject (Enforcement) in 
addition to between-subject design (Highway, Bus, and Antibiotics). 
The incompatibility of our findings with the subjective probability explanation 
indicates that explanations building on the greater complexity of circumstantial 
evidence cannot fully account for the responders’ disinclination to rely on this type 
of evidence. Had the fact finders been reluctant to impose liability based on 
circumstantial evidence because of their difficulty in understanding and drawing 
conclusions from such evidence, one would expect this difficulty to affect, first and 
foremost, the judged probability of the defendant’s fault, and that we would find a 
correlation between the subjective probability assessment and the responders’ 
willingness to impose liability. Moreover, while in Antibiotics the circumstantial 
evidence (particularly in the double-inference condition) was indeed more complex 
than in the direct-evidence condition, this can hardly be said of Highway, 
Enforcement, and Bus. Finally, in Antibiotics there was a considerable difference 
between the single-inference and double-inference conditions in terms of their 
complexity, but no significant difference in terms of the responders’ willingness to 
impose liability. Thus, complexity and clarity of the evidence cannot fully account 
for the general phenomenon we identified in our experiments. 
Another explanation for the different treatment given to circumstantial evidence 
builds on the abstract and pallid nature of such evidence.83 However, the evidence 
presented in all four experiments in both conditions was of the exact same character 
(e.g., eyewitness testimony or scientific/technological) and did not involve naked 
statistical evidence. This would indicate that the explanations based on the relative 
representational versus abstract, narrative versus rhetorical, unconditional versus 
                                                                                                                 
 
 82. See Arkes et al., supra note 44, at 280−90; Niedermeier et al., supra note 38, 
534−41; Wells, supra note 36, at 741−48. 
 83. See supra notes 26–29 and accompanying text. 
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probabilistic, vivid versus pallid, concrete versus general, and emotional versus 
unexciting nature of the evidence are incomplete. For instance, in Highway and 
Enforcement, the evidence produced by the one-camera and two-camera systems 
was equally abstract, probabilistic, pallid, concrete, and unexciting. 
Similar observations apply to the case-specificity argument, according to which 
naked statistical evidence is insufficient for imposing liability, even when the 
probability is very high, because the weight or resiliency of the evidence is equally 
important. According to this argument, if the assessed probability rests on too little 
information or on general, non-case-specific evidence, it should not be relied upon 
in order to determine liability.84 While it is easy to equate naked statistical evidence 
and circumstantial evidence, the two represent distinct issues. None of our 
experiments included naked statistical evidence. Rather, they all involved case-
specific evidence that was either direct or circumstantial. It is unclear why, for 
example, in Highway one would consider the results of the two-camera system as 
having less weight or as less resilient than the results of the one-camera system. 
Our findings also suggest that the reluctance to impose liability based on 
circumstantial evidence is not necessarily a matter of responsibility taking.85 
According to the responsibility-taking theory, when relying on direct evidence, the 
fact finder feels less accountable for erroneous judgments because it is not her 
inference, but rather the witness’s fallibility or dishonesty that brought about the 
regrettable judicial error. As a result, the fact finder is less hesitant to impose 
liability based on direct evidence. 
When viewing the decisions subjects made in all experiments through the prism 
of responsibility taking, it is clear that there was no real difference between the two 
conditions used in the Highway, Bus, and Antibiotics scenarios in this regard. 
Certainly no issue of responsibility taking was involved in the Enforcement 
experiment, where responders were asked to choose between two speed-
enforcement systems ex ante—in the abstract—rather than to impose liability on 
any particular person. Furthermore, in Bus, responders were not asked to make the 
decision themselves, but rather to indicate how another person—the judge—should 
decide. This did not, however, counteract the responders’ reluctance to rely on 
circumstantial circumstances.86 
The experiments show that the fact-to-evidence theory cannot fully account for 
fact finders’ behavior either.87 The fact-to-evidence theory posits that people are far 
more inclined to rely on evidence when the decision of whether to impose liability 
bears on the reliability of the evidence. Our findings, however, do not support this 
conjecture.88 For instance, in both conditions of the Bus experiment, convicting the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 84. See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text. 
 85. See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text. 
 86. Our vignettes also varied in terms of the identity of the person who drew the 
inference. In Highway and Enforcement, it was “possible to infer” from the indirect 
evidence; in Bus, “the policeman inferred”; and in Antibiotics the plaintiff urged the court 
(that is, the responder) to infer. Arguably, responders should have experienced greater 
personal responsibility in Antibiotics and less in Bus. In fact, the disinclination to impose 
inference-based liability was common to all four scenarios. 
 87. See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text. 
 88. In this regard our findings corroborate the findings of Niedermeier, Kerr, and Messé. 
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driver implied that the policeman’s testimony was very reliable, and acquitting the 
driver implied that it was insufficiently reliable; yet there was a huge difference 
between the two conditions in the willingness to convict.89 
We then turn to the ease-of-simulation theory.90 As originally conceived by 
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky91 and subsequently studied in various 
contexts,92 the simulation heuristic pertains to how likely one thinks it is that an 
outcome will occur or an event has occurred (or could have occurred). According to 
the theory, the easier it is to imagine a scenario (and the harder it is to imagine a 
competing one), the more probable it appears to be.93 Several scholars have tied 
this pattern of thinking to the way in which fact finders treat circumstantial 
evidence.94 The core argument is that, by its very nature, circumstantial evidence 
makes it easier to imagine alternative scenarios in which the defendant is not liable. 
As a result, fact finders will systematically under-assess the probability that the 
defendant is liable when asked to base liability on circumstantial evidence. 
The ease-of-simulation heuristic cannot explain fact finders’ disinclination to 
impose liability based on circumstantial evidence in the experiments reported in 
this Article. As both Bus and Antibiotics suggest, this disinclination is not based on 
a cognitive process that is tied to participants’ judgments of probabilities. In the 
former, no difference was found between the direct and the circumstantial groups 
with respect to probability assessments; in the latter, the disinclination remained 
significant even when controlling for the differences in subjective probability. 
Explaining the reluctance to base liability on purely circumstantial evidence by the 
                                                                                                                 
See Niedermeier et al., supra note 38, at 536−39. 
 89. In Enforcement, it could hardly be argued that choosing one system necessarily 
implied that it was more accurate than the alternative. In that experiment, 38 of 49 
responders preferred one of the systems (one-camera/direct system or two-camera/inference 
system) to the other. Of those 38, 19 (50%) would stick with their preferred choice even if its 
accuracy were lower than that of the alternative. 
 90. See supra notes 35−41 and accompanying text. 
 91. Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 37. 
 92. See, e.g., Ariel S. Levi & John B. Pryor, Use of the Availability Heuristic in 
Probability Estimates of Future Events: The Effects of Imagining Outcomes Versus 
Imagining Reasons, 40 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 219, 222−29 (1987) 
(examining the factors affecting people’s prediction of who will win the elections); David 
Raune, Andrew MacLeod & Emily A. Holmes, The Simulation Heuristic and Visual 
Imagery in Pessimism for Future Negative Events in Anxiety, 12 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. & 
PSYCHOTHERAPY 313, 315−21 (2005) (studying the assessed probability of future negative 
events by patients suffering from clinical anxiety). 
 93. The ease of simulation may depend on the ease of simulating other similar events, 
Dale T. Miller, William Turnbull & Cathy McFarland, When a Coincidence Is Suspicious: 
The Role of Mental Simulation, 57 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 581, 583−86 (1989), 
and counterfactuals, Edward R. Hirt & Keith D. Markman, Multiple Explanation: A 
Consider-an-Alternative Strategy for Debiasing Judgments, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 1069, 1072−83 (1995), as well as on the perceived normality of different events, 
Daniel Kahneman & Dale T. Miller, Norm Theory: Comparing Reality to Its Alternatives, 93 
PSYCHOL. REV. 136, 137 (1986); Miller et al., supra note 93. The ease of simulation is to 
some extent manipulable. See, e.g., Niedermeier et al., supra note 38, at 539−41. 
 94. See, e.g., Heller, supra note 1; Niedermeier et al., supra note 38; Sykes & Johnson, 
supra note 40. 
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ease-of-simulation heuristic thus does not fall in line with the conventional 
meaning of this heuristic that is directly tied to an estimate of the likelihood of an 
event. 
Moreover, to a large degree our vignettes were designed to eliminate alternative 
explanations and thus rule out the influence of this heuristic. For instance, in the 
inference condition in Highway, given the distance between the two cameras and 
the time that elapsed between the documenting of the car by each camera, there is 
simply no way the driver did not violate the speed limit. True, one could imagine 
an error in the system, but the phrasing of both conditions was identical in this 
respect: “The probability of an error in the camera system is 2%.” Similarly, in the 
inference condition of Bus, the only explanation for the fact that four tourists were 
left behind after the two minibuses that arrived empty were filled up and drove 
away is that there were fifty-four passengers on the tourist bus.95 Any alternative 
explanation was ruled out, as the questionnaire explicitly stated that fifty people 
were driven away on the two minibuses.96 
Last we consider the fairness explanation arguably supported by our findings. In 
Highway, Bus, and Antibiotics there was a statistically significant positive 
correlation between subjects’ decisions to impose liability and their judged fairness 
of doing so. However, it is unclear how this correlation should be interpreted. One 
possibility is that imposition of liability is unfair because it is prone to error due to 
either the inherent inconclusiveness of circumstantial evidence or its lesser weight 
and resiliency. However, this does not seem to be the notion of fairness envisioned 
by the responders, as in none of the experiments was the imposition of liability 
mediated by the assessed probability that the defendant actually committed the act, 
and in all experiments the evidence was case specific.97 
                                                                                                                 
 
 95. The lack of a statistically significant difference between the subjective probability 
assessments in the two conditions suggests that subjects did not view an alternative scenario 
as plausible. 
 96. Interestingly, despite its centrality in the literature, the ease-of-simulation theory 
fails to provide a complete explanation for the different treatment of direct and 
circumstantial evidence even in Niedermeier and his coauthors’ own study. Niedermeier et 
al., supra note 38. Their study directly tested the mediating effect of the ease-of-simulation 
variable on verdicts in two of its experiments. While in both experiments the ease of 
simulation affected the verdicts, in neither did it fully mediate the effect of type of evidence. 
Id. at 536−41. Although controlling for ease of simulation considerably reduced the 
proportion of variance in the verdicts, there remained a statistically significant difference 
between the verdicts in the different conditions. Id. at 538, 541. Thus, even according to 
Niedermeier and his coauthors, the ease of simulation provides an incomplete explanation 
for factfinders’ behavior. A more elaborate examination of the ease-of-simulation 
explanation was recently conducted by Arkes and his coauthors. Arkes et al., supra note 44. 
They found that sometimes this factor (which they dub “imaginability”) possibly mediates 
the verdict, yet sometimes it is unrelated to the verdict or even related in a manner 
completely contrary to the ease-of-simulation hypothesis. Id. at 282–86. 
 97. It may also be argued that in Highway, the speed-camera system was perceived as 
fairer because it is more forgiving: It does not penalize drivers who violate the speed limit in 
the parts of the highway not covered by a speed camera, that is, most of the road. However, 
the two-camera system is more forgiving in the sense that it only captures the driver’s 
average speed in the pertinent section of the road, which is typically lower than the highest 
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A different notion of fairness might have to do with people’s expectations and 
the “rules of the game.” Perhaps people believe that they should only be penalized 
if they are caught in the act. Imposing an inference-based liability is thus seen as 
unfair, regardless of the reliability of the circumstantial evidence. While such a 
notion of fairness possibly plays a role in some contexts, it can hardly serve as a 
general explanation for the reluctance to impose inference-based liability. First, it is 
unclear that, in deciding whether to impose criminal or civil liability, people 
consider the wrongdoer’s expectations as to the type of evidence that might be used 
against her. Second, when one’s behavior harms another person, as in Antibiotics 
and in Wells’s blue bus scenario,98 not compensating the injured party because the 
evidence supporting her claim is not the type expected by the defendant seems 
considerably more unfair than using such evidence. Finally, the present notion of 
fairness does not account for the disinclination to rely on circumstantial evidence 
even when the pertinent evidence, such as forensic evidence found at the scene of 
the crime, has long been used by the police and is now part of the “rules of the 
game.”99 
At the end of the day, it may well be that the responders in our experiments 
understood “fair” as roughly equivalent to “appropriate” or “acceptable.” The 
decision to impose criminal or civil liability and the characterization of the 
imposition of liability as fair echoed one another, possibly reflecting the same 
cognitive process. Thus, the answer to the fairness question was possibly a post hoc 
rationalization of responders’ answers to the verdict question. 
To sum up, our findings show that the reluctance of fact finders to impose 
liability based solely on indirect, circumstantial evidence is stronger and further 
reaching than demonstrated in previous studies. None of the explanations proposed 
thus far for this reluctance are completely satisfactory. Our findings reveal an 
independent, deeply rooted anti-inference heuristic. 
Much like other simplifying heuristics, the anti-inference heuristic assists people 
to make judgments under uncertainty. It functions as a substitute for extensive 
algorithmic processing and yields judgments that are usually accurate. Ordinarily, 
when we see something with our own eyes, or when someone tells us that she saw 
something herself, that event actually happened; this is not necessarily true of 
conclusions drawn from circumstantial evidence. We tend to trust our power of 
vision more than we trust our power of deduction. However—like other biases and 
heuristics—the anti-inference heuristic also gives rise to systematic error; it 
strongly affects decisions even when the objective and subjective probabilities of 
the pertinent occurrence are equal according to circumstantial and direct 
evidence.100 The anti-inference heuristic may thus be seen as yet another 
                                                                                                                 
speed she drove in that section. 
 98. Wells, supra note 36. 
 99. The rules of the game may change over time. Thus, while speed cameras have come 
to be regarded as a commonplace in Israel (where the experiments were conducted), two-
camera systems of the kind described in Highway and Enforcement are not ordinarily used in 
Israel and can thus be perceived as unfair. Even if this conjecture helps to explain the results 
of Highway and Enforcement, it does not seem relevant to Bus or Antibiotics. 
 100. There is an intriguing correspondence between our findings and the findings of 
experiments studying young children’s overly rigid application of a “seeing = knowing” rule 
according to which facts can only be determined through direct evidence and not through 
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manifestation of overgeneralization. It reflects an inability of people to perfectly 
analyze the decision environment in which they function. While preferring to rely 
on direct evidence might be a prudent strategy in day-to-day life, in some contexts, 
it might be a problematic decision-rule. 
B. Policy Implications 
Having described the positive findings of our experiments, we now turn to 
analyze their potential normative implications.101 First, we explore the implications 
for the rules governing the structure of trials. In this regard, we examine whether 
legal systems can adopt strategies that will debias fact finders. We then turn to 
examine the implications for evidence law and for substantive legal rules. As the 
discussion will show, legal systems anticipating the anti-inference bias adopt legal 
presumptions and structure prohibitions that, to a certain degree, circumvent it. 
1. Debiasing Fact Finders 
The existence of a systematic aversion towards basing liability on circumstantial 
evidence suggests that like other heuristics, the anti-inference bias might drive 
judicial decision making astray. Thus, legal systems will be able to improve the 
quality of fact finding by circumventing the bias through proper regulation. Just as 
the legal system might try to overcome cognitive phenomena such as the hindsight 
bias,102 it might also try to debias fact finders influenced by the anti-inference bias.  
A straightforward avenue to attempt counteracting the anti-inference bias is 
instructing fact finders to afford equal weight to direct and circumstantial evidence. 
Numerous jurisdictions have taken this path by stressing in their jury instructions 
that direct and circumstantial evidence are in principle equally reliable.103 In 
Connecticut, for example, the instructions state that: “There is no legal distinction 
between direct and circumstantial evidence as far as probative value; the law 
                                                                                                                 
inference. See, e.g., Ori Friedman, Richard Griffin, Hiram Brownell & Ellen Winner, 
Problems with the Seeing = Knowing Rule, 6 DEVELOPMENTAL SCI. 505, 506−07 (2003) 
(presenting a critical review of the literature on the matter); Ted Ruffman, Do Children 
Understand the Mind by Means of Simulation or a Theory? Evidence from Their 
Understanding of Inference, 11 MIND & LANGUAGE 388, 393−400 (1996) (reporting 
experimental findings documenting the phenomenon). 
 101. To be sure, in the following analysis we focus our discussion on the possibility that 
fact finders exhibit excessive caution towards circumstantial evidence, and not excessive 
confidence towards direct evidence. To the extent the latter option reflects the decision- 
making pattern, the proposals outlined in this Part should be adjusted accordingly.  
 102. See, e.g., D. Jordan Lowe & Philip M.J. Reckers, The Effects of Hindsight Bias on 
Jurors’ Evaluations of Auditor Decisions, 25 DECISION SCI. 401, 408−16 (1994) (presenting 
experimental findings on successful debiasing in the hindsight context); David B. Wexler & 
Robert F. Schopp, How and When to Correct for Juror Hindsight Bias in Mental Health 
Malpractice Litigation: Some Preliminary Observations, 7 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 485, 489−92 
(1989) (exploring debiasing strategies in the context of the hindsight bias). 
 103. See, e.g., Jacquelyn L. Bain, A Proposed Definition of Reasonable Doubt and the 
Demise of the Circumstantial Evidence Charge Following Hankins v. State, 15 ST. MARY’S 
L.J. 353, 362 (1984) (noting the equal weight now afforded to circumstantial evidence in 
different jurisdictions). 
222 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 89:195 
 
permits you to give equal weight to both, but it is for you to decide how much 
weight to give to any particular evidence.”104 Arguably, legislatures specifying such 
instructions both acknowledge the existence of the anti-inference bias, and attempt 
to deal with it by offering jurors proper guidance. 
The effectiveness of such instructions, however, is not self-evident. The research 
on jury instructions in other areas suggests that instructions are often ineffective 
since juries tend to disregard them.105 In the context of the right to remain silent, for 
example, studies have documented the tendency of jurors to hold the exercise of 
this right against defendants despite explicit instructions not to do so. Thus, after 
conducting a series of stylized experiments on the issue, David Shaffer concluded 
that “this bias against defendants who invoked the Fifth Amendment was apparent 
even though the judge had affirmed the defendant’s right to so plead and had 
instructed jurors that they were to draw no inferences about the defendant’s 
innocence or guilt from his use of this constitutional privilege.”106 
Furthermore, in some cases the strategy of jury instructions might even backfire 
and do more harm than good.107 In the context of information about previous 
convictions, for instance, Kerri Pickel demonstrated that people are more likely to 
convict after being exposed to information regarding past convictions if they are 
instructed to disregard that information.108 Similarly, once the circumstantial nature 
of evidence is made salient by the instructions, jurors might be drawn to discount 
their probative value. 
A second path policy makers might choose to take in order to deal with the anti-
inference bias is to bring it to the attention of fact finders. According to this line of 
thought, courts should allow for expert witness testimony that will explain to fact 
finders the precise pitfalls associated with the anti-inference bias.109 Arguably, a 
detailed scientific explanation on the bias might prove more effective than standard 
jury instructions that are easy to ignore. From a legal perspective, allowing for 
expert testimony regarding the anti-inference bias should not face insurmountable 
difficulties. Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence grants judges broad 
discretion over the admissibility of expert witness testimony.110 That said, one 
                                                                                                                 
 
 104. CONN. CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 2.4-1 (2007) (modified 2008). 
 105. See Joel D. Lieberman & Jamie Arndt, Understanding the Limits of Limiting 
Instructions: Social Psychological Explanations for the Failures of Instructions to Disregard 
Pretrial Publicity and Other Inadmissible Evidence, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 677, 703 
(2000) (stating that “the majority of extant empirical research indicates that jurors do not 
adhere to limiting instructions”). 
 106. David R. Shaffer, The Defendant’s Testimony, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EVIDENCE 
AND TRIAL PROCEDURE 124, 143 (Saul M. Kassin & Lawrence S. Wrightsman eds., 1985). 
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 109. For a similar proposal in the context of the hindsight bias, see Wexler & Schopp, 
supra note 102, at 490−92. 
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should acknowledge the limitation of this solution. Expert evidence is costly,111 and 
it is unclear whether litigating parties will find it beneficial to invest the necessary 
resources in producing it. When the stakes are relatively low, as they so often are, 
an expert witness will probably not justify the costs associated with summoning her 
to court. 
Finally, while the issue of debiasing raises numerous practical questions relating 
to the feasibility of such policies, it also raises a more principled dilemma. If the 
anti-inference bias reflects deeply held epistemological and moral intuitions, 
circumventing it might adversely affect the desirable correspondence between 
peoples’ prevalent perceptions and the outcomes of adjudication. As Jeffrey 
Rachlinski concluded, a judgment produced by a debiased trier of fact “might seem 
less fair than an uncorrected, biased judgment.”112 Our findings substantiate this 
concern. In Highway, Bus, and Antibiotics, we asked the responders not only to 
decide (or indicate how a judge should decide) the case, but also to assess the 
fairness of imposing liability. In all three experiments, there was a statistically 
significant positive correlation between the answers to the two questions: The fairer 
the responders judged the imposition of liability, the likelier they were to convict 
the defendant or accept the claim. Put differently, people’s reluctance to impose 
liability based on indirect evidence correlates with their belief that imposing such 
liability is less “fair.”113 
Counteracting the anti-inference bias might therefore adversely affect the 
legitimacy and effectiveness of the legal system. A significant body of work has 
demonstrated the importance of the perceived fairness of the criminal justice 
system for its effectiveness.114 More recently, scholars have extended this argument 
and suggested that perceived fairness might play a key role in fostering cooperation 
in civil contexts as well.115 Deciphering the precise connections between the anti-
inference bias, circumventing it, and perceptions of fairness, lies beyond the scope 
of this Article. Nonetheless, any legal treatment of the issue will have to take this 
issue into account. 
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2. Rules of Evidence 
Aware of the challenges associated with direct debiasing, legal policy makers 
may resort to indirect measures in order to deal with the anti-inference bias. The 
obvious example is the introduction of legal presumptions. The law often resorts to 
presumptions in order to assign liability.116 A presumption allows “the existence of 
an ultimate fact, or presumed fact, to be taken as established where other predicate 
or basic facts have been established.”117 Thus, for example, defendants who cannot 
present a reasonable explanation for the fact that they are in possession of recently 
stolen goods might be convicted of stealing those goods based on a presumption 
deducing theft from possession.118 Similarly, drugs that are found in the 
defendant’s home might be assumed to be in his possession based on a presumption 
connecting the two.119 Interestingly, the use of such presumptions is not limited to 
jurisdictions that delegate fact finding to nonprofessional jurors.120 
Despite their prevalence, the existence of legal presumptions is somewhat 
puzzling. As courts often note, presumptions rest on the existence of a “common-
sense” connection between the fact that was established and the fact that is deduced 
from it.121 Actually, such a connection is a precondition for the constitutionality of 
the presumption.122 On its face, there is no need to instruct fact finders to use 
common sense when determining facts, since that is what they are expected to do 
whether instructed or not. As one judge noted, she would be “hard-pressed” if 
asked by jurors for clarifications regarding how they should implement a 
presumption.123 
The anti-inference bias offers an explanation for the pervasiveness of legal 
presumptions.124 Given the ability of presumptions “‘to encourage’ the jury to find 
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fact B . . . once fact A . . . is proven,”125 one could view them as a mild form of 
regulation that counteracts the effect of the bias. By adopting presumptions, the law 
pushes fact finders to make common-sense deductions they might otherwise be 
reluctant to make. Thus, presumptions help steer fact finders towards more accurate 
decisions. 
3. Substantive Legal Rules 
Thus far our analysis has focused on the implications of the anti-inference bias 
on adjudication. This mode of analysis is in line with traditional legal scholarship 
that envisions a division of labor between substantive legal rules and the rules of 
evidence and procedure.126 Whereas substantive legal rules aim to promote the 
general goals of the legal system such as fairness, just desert, and efficiency, the 
rules of evidence and procedure focus on advancing the goals of the judicial 
process, such as enhancement of accuracy of fact finding and desirable 
apportionment of the risk of error.127 
Recent research, however, has demonstrated that this dichotomous view of the 
legal system is inaccurate. On one hand, the rules governing the legal process are, 
or at least should be, attuned to the primary goals of the legal system.128 For 
example, the rules of evidence might mediate between deterrence and retribution as 
the guiding principle of criminal law.129 On the other hand, substantive rules might 
be used to reduce the risk of judicial error. For instance, sanctions can be calibrated 
such that they reduce the probability of wrongful convictions.130 
In the context of the anti-inference bias, policy makers aware of its existence 
might choose to deal with it by structuring prohibitions in a way that will overcome 
fact finders’ reluctance to deduce liability. One strategy in this regard is to broaden 
the scope of prohibitions, such that they not only encompass the primary behavior 
that the policy maker wishes to regulate, but also related behaviors from which one 
could deduce that the primary behavior took place. By adopting such a legislative 
strategy, the state no longer needs to persuade fact finders to infer liability, as the 
inference was already determined by the legislature. 
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Criminalizing preparation to commit a crime is a case in point. Preparatory 
offenses are closely related to the law of criminal attempts.131 Criminalizing 
attempts promotes important policy goals such as deterrence and prevention. From 
a deterrence perspective, it allows punishing offenders even when they fail to 
complete their plan, and thus cheaply raises the probability of punishment.132 From 
a prevention perspective, it enables the police to intervene prior to the completion 
of the criminal act and empowers the state to incapacitate individuals who 
demonstrate a propensity for criminal activity.133 Thus, it is unsurprising that most 
jurisdictions criminalize attempts in one way or another.134 
Securing convictions in attempt cases might, however, prove a thorny task since 
they always involve situations in which at least one of the objective elements of the 
crime is absent.135 According to the Model Penal Code, to commit an attempt, an 
actor must take “a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in 
his commission of the crime.”136 Thus, in cases involving incomplete attempts, fact 
finders are left to deduce missing elements of the criminal plan from circumstantial 
evidence. If, for example, a suspect is apprehended near a bank with a gun and a 
demand note, the fact finder will have to infer based on circumstantial evidence 
what would have happened had the police not intervened. Fact finders subject to 
the anti-inference bias are expected to exhibit a special aversion towards convicting 
people of such attempts.137 
As policy makers become aware of the reluctance to convict in criminal attempt 
cases, they can try to overcome this reluctance by redesigning criminal 
prohibitions. Specifically, they could define certain acts of preparation as 
independent crimes. Once the possession of burglary tools or the conducting of a 
sexual conversation over the Internet with a minor are defined as crimes,138 fact 
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finders no longer have to deduce what the defendant would have done in order to 
punish him.139 Rather, they can assign liability based on direct evidence.140 In fact, 
numerous scholars have taken a view that the practical effect of offences such as 
possession of burglars’ tools is to “shift the burden” to defendants regarding the 
nature of their activity.141 In other words, they might serve as an antidote to the 
anti-inference bias in criminal attempt cases. 
To be sure, while our analysis highlights a possible explanation for the 
prevalence of preparatory offences, it does not necessarily justify them. Preparatory 
offences might effectively overcome the anti-inference bias, yet they might unjustly 
intrude on individual liberty,142 and, given their wide scope, they might deter 
socially beneficial behavior.143 The current discussion is therefore closely tied to 
the discussion on debiasing. Inasmuch as legal systems are better able to deal with 
the anti-inference bias, the need for preparatory offences is expected to diminish. 
Other things being equal, a shift from the current regime—of broad prohibitions 
coupled with biased fact finders that are reluctant to impose liability—to a regime 
of narrow prohibitions that are enforced by unbiased fact finders, seems desirable. 
It will enable fact finders to avoid punishing blameless behavior while assuring that 
those who deserve to be punished will not escape liability. 
C. Limitations and Future Research 
In this final subpart, we acknowledge potential criticisms to this project, and 
outline potential avenues of future research that could help address these limitations 
and further our understanding of the anti-inference bias. 
As is always the case with experimental work, one should be cautious regarding 
the external validity of our findings. A courtroom is not a decision-making lab, and 
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different forces might interact with the anti-inference heuristic during judicial 
proceedings. In this regard, future research should study decisions made by both 
judges and jurors, and explore the extent to which the bias drives actual rulings. 
While exploring this question in a quantitative manner might prove a difficult task, 
additional methodologies such as systematic qualitative studies of jurors might 
prove useful. 
Future research should also pay special attention to the role of two key figures 
that can play a critical role with respect to the anti-inference bias. Arguably, given 
their role as repeat players, lawyers are well aware of the precise scope of the bias. 
Thus, defense lawyers might attempt to strengthen the bias in order to make a 
favorable outcome more probable.144 Framing evidence as merely circumstantial 
seems to be a routine tactic of the defense.145 These lawyers might exacerbate the 
anti-inference bias by pointing to the existence of alternative explanations for the 
circumstantial evidence. As demonstrated by Niedermeier and his colleagues, a 
defense lawyer’s argument that highlights alternative causal possibilities can be an 
effective way to bring about a significant decline in the inclination of fact finders to 
assign liability.146 Furthermore, by making those alternative scenarios as vivid as 
possible—for instance, by using computer simulations—lawyers can render this 
strategy even more effective.147 Mapping out the precise way defense lawyers use 
the bias could shed more light on the intricate details of the bias. Similarly, 
studying the way in which prosecutors and plaintiff lawyers attempt to overcome 
those efforts might point towards effective debiasing techniques. 
A second group of players that merits specific research are judges. While there 
is no reason to assume that the psychology of legally trained subjects, including 
judges, differs fundamentally from that of other people—and some studies have 
indeed demonstrated that it does not148—some studies do show that professionals 
can learn to employ debiasing mechanisms.149 More fundamentally, one must be 
exceedingly cautious in deriving normative conclusions from laboratory results, as 
it is unclear to what extent the anti-inference bias persists in the face of legal 
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arguments aimed to counteract it. Further research involving debiasing techniques 
and research with professional judges would enhance our understanding of judicial 
behavior and the need and prospects for regulation in this context. 
Finally, additional research should focus on the precise psychological 
mechanisms underlying the anti-inference bias. For example, even if neither the 
objective probability that a certain event occurred, nor the subjective assessment of 
that probability, differ between direct-evidence and the inference conditions, 
perhaps subjects’ confidence in their subjective assessment differs between the two 
conditions. To be sure, a positive correlation between subjects’ confidence in their 
probability assessment and their reluctance to impose liability based on 
circumstantial evidence would not ipso facto justify the anti-inference bias. It may, 
however, open up interesting possibilities regarding the relationship between this 
bias and other phenomena such as ambiguity aversion.150 It may also shed light on 
the normative argument made in the context of naked statistical evidence, namely 
that fact finders should take into account not only the probability that a certain 
event happened, but also the weight or resiliency of the evidence supporting this 
probability.151 Perhaps one’s confidence in one’s probability assessment is 
correlated with the “weight” of the available evidence. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The experiments described in this study demonstrate that the disinclination of 
fact finders to convict defendants or impose civil liability based solely on 
circumstantial evidence is more powerful than previously realized. It characterizes 
not only statistical, probabilistic, inconclusive, forensic, and non-case-specific 
evidence, but also non-statistical, non-probabilistic, conclusive, eyewitness, and 
case-specific evidence. None of the theories proposed as explanations for this 
phenomenon provide a satisfactory account, indicating the presence of a robust, 
deep-rooted anti-inference bias. This tendency can explain some features of extant 
procedural and substantive rules, and it calls for careful consideration of possible 
legal reforms. 
Sherlock Holmes famously says that “when you have eliminated all which is 
impossible, then whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth.”152 Our 
findings indicate, however, that most people—including judicial fact finders—
adopt the maxim used as the title for one of Carter Dixon’s Sir Henry Merrivale 
mysteries, “Seeing is Believing.”153 
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